

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XX. No. 14.]

LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1811.

[Price 1s.]

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SICILY.—While I was, in my last, making a few cursory remarks upon the language, which our venal prints were beginning to hold with regard to our dear allies in the Anti-jacobin war, the Court of Sicily; at that time, when I was, with as much freedom as it was prudent to attempt to exercise, endeavouring to prepare the minds of my readers for what I expected soon to see take place; at that very time, as it now appears, Lord William Bentinck (a son of the late Duke of Portland and a brother of the present Duke) was actually arrived in England from Sicily, whither he had, but a few weeks before, been sent, as Commander in Chief of our army there and as our minister plenipotentiary, and where, as was seen in my last, he was expected to be the bearer of “strong and positive instructions.” The cause of his speedy return has not yet been publicly stated in plain terms; but, our venal prints have given us the supposed cause; and, upon their suppositions, taking into view the probability of the sources whence the suppositions really proceed, and the motives from which they have been promulgated amongst “this most thinking people,” some observations present themselves, and to these I beg leave to solicit the reader’s attention.—As a preparation, however, for these observations, it may not be amiss for us to refresh our memories as to matters, which the length of the war and the multitude and magnitude of its events, may well be supposed to have almost obliterated from our minds; and which are, nevertheless, necessary to be remembered, in order to give us clear notions, and to enable us to judge correctly, of what is now going on, and, which is of more importance, of the events, which every one must now anticipate.—Our connection with the Court of Sicily, I shall not, at present, attempt to trace farther back than the year 1805; but, the time will come and must come, when the previous part of that connection, when the events of 1799, when the deeds of the Bay of Naples and the part which Lord Nelson took therein, when the truly noble conduct of Sir

Thomas Troubridge and Captain Foote, when the fate of the Neapolitan Patriots, when, in short, all the acts of that time, in their unvarnished colours, will be consigned to the volume of history, and handed down to the impartial judgment of future times. In waiting, with all the patience that we can command, for the day when this sacred duty may be safely performed in a manner responsive to the demands of truth and justice; in waiting for that day, which, let us hope, is at no great distance, we will, because we must, content ourselves with tracing back our connection with the Court of Sicily to the year 1805.—In the month of September of this last mentioned year, the Emperor Napoleon being then at war with Austria and Russia, which war was terminated at Austerlitz, the Court of Sicily (then of the Two Sicilies) entered into a treaty of neutrality with the Emperor of France. The former stipulated to observe a strict neutrality during the war; and, especially, not to suffer any Russian or English troops to land in Naples, and not to commit its own troops to the command of any foreign power or officer. In consequence of the conclusion of which treaty, which was ratified on the 8th of October, 1805, the Emperor of France withdrew his troops from the territory of Naples, part of which he had, by way of precaution, occupied from the commencement of the present war with England. But, on the 20th of November, only about six weeks after the ratification of the treaty, an English and Russian squadron came into the Bay of Naples (the memorable theatre of the deeds of 1799!) and there landed a body of troops, amounting to about 24,000 men, 14,000 Russians under General Lasey, and 10,000 English under Sir James Craig. These troops, the landing of whom was not opposed, marched into the interior, in order, as was alledged by Russia, to make a diversion in favour of Austria; but, their landing was a signal for warlike preparations on the part of the Court of Naples, who thus, once more, seemed resolved to enter the field against Napoleon. Scarcely, however, were these preparations begun, when Napoleon, having subdued his two great enemies at

Austerlitz, dispatched an army, with his brother Joseph at its head, to drive the Neapolitan Court and its allies "into the sea." The effect of this was the flight of the Court of Naples to Sicily, preceded by the English army, who were utterly unequal to the task of resisting the mighty force of France for a single week. It was now, and probably for the last time, that the Court of the Two Sicilies crossed the *Bay of Naples*, that Bay which had been the scene of their triumph, in 1799, the never-to-be-forgotten 1799.—Since that time, the kingdom of Naples has owned the sway, first of Joseph Buonaparté, and afterwards of Prince Murat, now the king of Naples, and contending for the sway over Sicily also.—Our army went, as we have seen, to the island of Sicily, where it has been, with its augmentations, from the early part of the year 1806 to the present time.—The reader need hardly be reminded of the several attempts, which have been made by that army to recover the Neapolitan territory or to annoy the conqueror, but all which are well known to have wholly failed in their object, though upon one occasion, the battle of Maida, much skill as well as courage appear to have been displayed by sir John Stuart (who succeeded sir James Craig at Sicily) and by the officers and troops under his command.—From the time of the abandonment of Naples, our connection with the Court of Sicily became, of course, more close. That court was, in a measure, *ruined*. They had indeed a part of their dominions left; but, they had lost their palaces, their goods, all the absolute possessions of a Court, and, what is of more consequence, the far greater part of their revenues. Having, in this beggared situation, a war to carry on for the preservation of the remaining part of their dominions, they naturally looked to England for the greater part of the means necessary for that purpose; and, as the men who then ruled, like those who still rule this country, regarded, apparently, the preservation of Sicily as being of importance to us, the Court of Sicily obtained, and has ever since received from England a large annual *subsidy* for the purpose of enabling that Court to keep on foot an army of a certain strength for the purpose of assisting us in the defence of the island.—We shall see, in the publications, upon which I am about to remark, that this subsidy is regarded as the effect of the most pure *disinterestedness*, of the most sublime gene-

rosity, and, therefore, without entering here into the question of how far our government would be justified in expending the resources of England in the way of *gift* to the Court of Sicily, without any view to the *interest* of England; without entering prematurely upon that important question, we ought here to look back a little to the *cause* of the Court of Sicily being driven out of Naples and being reduced to the necessity of fighting for their last stake in Sicily, and to see what part we bore in the *producing of that cause*.—The Emperor Napoleon, in his order to his army, dated at Schoenbrunn, said, that the Court of Naples had been treacherous, that they had *broken their treaty of neutrality*, and that, therefore, they should cease to reign. Now, did the Russians and English land with the approbation of the then Court of Naples, or did they not? If they did, the charge of the Emperor Napoleon was *just*; and, if they did not, that Court lost their continental dominions on *our account*; they lost those dominions because we violated the *neutrality of their territory*; and which territory, be it well observed, we abandoned without a battle in its defence. A battle, with our trifling force, would have been useless; but, at any rate, we fought no battle in defence of the kingdom of Naples; and, be it also observed, that we gave up the contest against the remonstrances of the Court, whom, in fact, we left to *follow* our army to the island of Sicily. We wanted not the *will* to defend Naples against the French; but we wanted the *power*. The effect was the same to the Court of Sicily; and, whether we landed with the approbation of that Court, or against their will, the ruin that ensued was, it is clear to me, equally attributable to that landing. Therefore, when our writers are talking so loudly of our *generosity*, of the great *favours* which we have conferred on the Court of Sicily, and of their *ingratitude*, those writers must, surely, have wholly forgotten all the facts that I have now, with too much prolixity, perhaps, endeavoured to recall to the mind of the reader. Let it not be imagined, however, that I wish to be the defender or the apologist of the Court of Sicily. No, reader, I pray you not to imagine that; not to suppose, for one single moment, that I have any feeling of friendship for that Court. But, *truth* ought to be spoken of every one, be he who or what he may: the devil, according to the old saying, ought to have his due.—

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After this preface we may enter upon our remarks on the venal publications that are now putting forth.—We have long heard, in a sort of half-whisper, of certain misunderstandings in Sicily. These hireling vehicles have hinted at jealousies and want of cordiality; but, until now, we have not had it openly avowed, that the Court of Sicily, our old dear friends and Antijacobin associates, were at *enmity* with us; nay, that they were actually our enemies even in a warlike sense. This, however, we are now told, and we are also told of the proper *remedy* to be applied, which remedy is neither more nor less than a *seizure of the Sicilian Dominions for our own use*, lest they should fall into the hands of the French. We are told, by the same venal writers, who talk so much of our *disinterestedness* and *generosity*, that we ought to seize upon the country, of which we have so disinterestedly and generously come to the defence.—But, it is now time to hear the venal writers in their own words. I could quote several of them, but I shall, in the first instance, take the *Courier* of the 28th of September.—After advertizing to the fact of Lord W. Bentinck's return, the writer proceeds thus: “The PEOPLE of Sicily are known to be *well disposed to this country*, and to be grateful for the assistance we have afforded them, without which they would long since have been *invaded by the enemy*. The KING of Naples may have, and we believe has, *good intentions*, but the cares of Government are *too burthensome* for him, and he commits them to other hands. In the QUARTER to which we allude there has always been a *strange jealousy* of the English. Upon some minds obligations produce a feeling of hate instead of gratitude; and the presence of the objects conferring them is goading and painful. Such minds eagerly receive impressions unsavourable to those objects—an observation, the truth of which has been sensibly experienced in our alliance with Sicily. The PARTY to whom we allude seems to have felt as the *Tyrant* of old did, when in speaking of a person who had done him great service, he exclaimed—“He has conferred upon me too great obligations for me to love him.”—Our commerce has been subject to vexatious regulations—our military and naval force neither welcomed with the cordiality it deserved, nor furnished with the facilities which it had purchased with its treasures and

“its blood. If any errors were committed, they were magnified: while services, however signal, were under-rated, or received with reluctant acknowledgement. At first, it is said, we remonstrated gently, more “in pity than in anger”—but remonstrances were unattended to, and it was remarked that such of the Sicilian Nobility as had been the strongest in their attachment to us were coldly received, and their visits gradually dispensed with. Of these noblemen some have been *banished*. It was in this state of affairs that Lord W. Bentinck arrived at Palermo; and as may well be conceived, was instructed to speak a *decisive language*.—“We have afforded you, we are still affording you the most powerful and DISINTERESTED assistance—Co-operate with us heartily in a work of which you are to receive the EXCLUSIVE benefit.” It may be supposed that we accompanied this open language with the demand of CERTAIN PLEDGES of the good faith of the Sicilian Government; that we required the removal of those Counsellors who were known to be *hostile to our interests*, and who would paralyse any efforts that might be made for the safety of the kingdom. The manner in which this was received, and the language held in reply to our remonstrances, might, we speak only from conjecture, have been deemed by Lord W. Bentinck so offensive and affronting as to convince him that his immediate departure was the only step he could take consistently with the duty he owed to the Government of which he was the representative.—What course will be adopted by his Majesty's Ministers, we cannot of course be acquainted with—but there is one clear principle: “If our Ally, by *treachery*, or *negligence*, or *supineness*, will not use the means he has in his power to prevent his territories from falling into the hands of our enemy, and thereby increasing that enemy's means of annoying US, he can have no just cause of complaint against us if we no longer consider and treat him as a friendly power.”—Are there no thunderbolts! No, not for fellows like this; but there surely are stones, horseponds, pumps, blankets and broomsticks! What! and are our senses to be insulted in this manner! Will the public tolerate this gross, this abominable, insult! Will they bear to be told, first, that we have placed an army in Sicily from motives of the

most pure "DISINTERESTEDNESS;" that we have done all that we have done, and are doing in Sicily, purely for the purpose of serving the Sicilians; that they are to have the "EXCLUSIVE benefit" of all our exertions; will the public bear to be told this, and then, in the very next breath, be told, that the defence of the island is necessary to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy, and "thereby" "increasing THAT ENEMY'S MEANS "OF ANNOYING US?" Will the public bear this? If it will; if it will patiently hear this; why, then, all that I can say, is, that it matters very little what befalls such a public. And, indeed, nothing but severe suffering; nothing but rods of scorpions, can bring such a public to its senses, and make it distinguish between truth and falsehood.—Before we proceed any further with our remarks, it is necessary to observe, that, in all the hireling prints, there has been, within these few days, published a long extract from a work of CAPTAIN PASLEY, on the state of things in Sicily and on the policy proper for us to pursue with regard to that country and its Court. This extract, which I have inserted in another part of this Number, recommends the seizure of the island, unless the Court, for the preservation of the INDEPENDENCE of the country, will give up the command of the whole of their own army to us! I beg the reader's attention to this extract; for he may be quite sure, that the Court of Sicily has read it long ago, and that it has not failed to produce a suitable effect upon their minds.

—CAPT. PASLEY seems to have been the leader of those, who have now found out, that the Court of Sicily are not our friends. He has forgotten, if he ever knew, the history of our former connection with the Sicilian Court, when they reigned in Naples as well as in Sicily; he does not advert to, nor does he seem to have the least recollection or knowledge of, the events, which finally drove the Court of Sicily from their continental dominions, and that gave an English army a footing in Sicily; he appears to consider the island as having been attacked, or likely to be attacked, by the French, and that, under such circumstances, without our having had any hand in producing the embarrassments and dangers of the Court, we flew to their assistance; he talks of our *disinterestedness* and of the *gratitude* due to us, in precisely the same style as all the venal writers, and he surpasses them all, I think, in bitterness

against our dear Antijacobin ally. Having painted the conduct of the Court of Sicily in as black colours as he is well able, he comes to the *remedy*. He describes the state of the army of Sicily; he tells us what we are able to do, and what we ought to do; and the Courier of the 1st instant approves of his recommendation. It says: "In a preceding page we have inserted a long extract from Captain Pasley's work on our military policy and institutions. He enters very largely into the subject of our relations with Sicily: and it may be wise to adopt the policy he recommends." — This being the case, let us see what this, his recommendation, is, and what are the grounds, upon which he endeavours to justify it, whether in point of equity or policy. He speaks with great, and, I dare say, deserved, contempt of the Sicilian Troops; says that we should derive no assistance from them in case of an actual attack upon the Island; that our alliance with Sicily is upon the worst possible footing; that, to remedy this, we ought to request the court of Sicily "to appoint the British General, in Sicily, the Commander in Chief of their army, and also to place its Commissariat and Paymaster's offices in the hands of our Commissaries and Paymasters; that the Sicilian Troops now look upon the British Troops with envy, and, perhaps, with hatred;" that even this "modification" of the terms of the alliance would be very disadvantageous for Great Britain, "for that nothing can be more unfair and unjust, than that the whole of the resources of the great and rich island of Sicily should be solely applied to the pomp and pleasures of its court, and to the charges of the civil administration, without leaving, at least, some surplus of revenue for us; that, by such an arrangement, however, we should find ourselves much more secure in Sicily as a MILITARY STATION." He then says, that by way of objection to these alterations, it may possibly be urged by the court of Sicily, that there is a *treaty*, that we cannot, with justice, infringe this *treaty*, and that, the proper time to have made the arrangements now proposed was when we entered into the *treaty* in question. Anticipating this objection, he says, that the court of Sicily, to set up this *treaty* with effect, must be able to show that they have not violated, or departed from, their part of the *contract*. But, he says, that

this they cannot show; for, that they have stipulated to keep constantly on foot a well-disciplined regular army of a certain strength, and that they have not done this; that their army is not well-disciplined, clothed, or paid; "that *their conduct to their troops has been shameful and oppressive*, as both officers and soldiers *have no scruple in openly asserting*; that "we have, by this court of Sicily, always been deceived by *false musters*; that, "this being the case, we are no longer bound by the treaty, and that the least thing we can do is to *withdraw our Subsidy*, "and leave them to maintain their own army in the best way they can out of "their own resources." He then proceeds to say, that this would be a better thing for us than even the punctual fulfilment of the present treaty; for, that we should, with the subsidy money, be able to raise a better army than that of Sicily is, and that the court of Sicily would, in this case, "forfeit all claim to our NATIONAL GENEROSITY." Anticipating, that this step on our part might induce the court of Sicily to *make peace with Napoleon*, he says, that this would be the most fortunate thing in the world for us, for that "we shall have a much better chance of success in Sicily in fighting there "as the *enemies*, than in fighting as the "allies, of the Sicilian government." He says, that the French cannot come to their aid without our permission; that the Sicilian army would be easily beaten by us; that WE MIGHT ARM THE PEOPLE OF SICILY IN OUR FAVOUR. Therefore, he says, hostilities on the part of the court of Sicily are by no means to be *dreaded*; but that, on the *contrary*, "they would give us a RIGHT once more "to TAKE POSSESSION OF SICILY "FOR OURSELVES, which would be "attended with the most BENEFICIAL "EFFECTS TO OUR POWER AND "PROSPERITY; and, that we ought "not to have the SMALLEST SCRUPLE "in adopting this VIGOROUS measure, "if the court of Palermo, by their MIS- "CONDUCT, give us JUST REASON "for so doing;" and the "misconduct," which would give us this "just reason," he explains to mean, a refusal of "our "MODERATE and REASONABLE re- "quest, that WE should COMMAND "an army that we ourselves PAY."— Reader, is it necessary to say any more of this, than just to observe, that this is the language of all the hireling prints in

England; of all those, who for so many years, have been the advocates of the war in Sicily?—As to the conduct of the Sicilian Court, our dearly beloved Anti-republican friends, I shall leave that to be described by their associates; I shall leave that to the Antijacobins, and shall be more apt to give them credit in this case than in almost any other; but, I must say, that it is somewhat surprising, that souls, so formed by nature for harmonious intercourse, should have permitted any thing to produce hostility between them; and, in spite of present appearances, I am inclined to think, that they will make all up again; that they will shake hands and be friends again, and hang together as to all *practical purposes*, just as the opposing parties of a certain assembly do, though they hate one another like poison. I think they will "rally" round the good old cause, and bury their hatred to one another in their greater hatred of Jacobins, or reformers.—But, all this while, the people of England, their blood and their taxes, seem to pass for nothing. We are told of the generosity of defending the court of Naples; we are told of these fine acts of generosity on the parts of our government; but, to hear these writers, one would imagine, that they gave the money out of *their own pockets*. The fact is, however, that the people of England pay, in subsidy, to the Court of Sicily, 400,000*l.* a year, and have done this for several years last past. Four hundred thousand pounds a year, while there are twelve hundred thousand paupers in England and Wales; while the taxes are so heavy as to be paid with the greatest difficulty; and while it is notorious that this subsidy causes an issue of bank notes that adds very greatly to the depreciation of the paper money.—This is a matter that never seems to enter into the heads of any of those who inveigh against the conduct of the Court of Sicily. These writers make no scruple to assert that that court are our enemies; but, such is their contempt of the people of England, that they do not seem to think it at all necessary to say a word in the way of excuse for those, who give nearly half a million a year of our money to our enemies; and that, too, if what these writers now say be true, long after it was well known that they were our enemies. But, the fact is, that this set of politicians, the whole set of them, despise the people of England more than they do any other of God's creatures.

—Upon reading the above passages, in which the *oppression of the Sicilian troops* is spoken of, one cannot scarcely forbear laughing outright. We are not told indeed in *what manner* they are oppressed; we are not told precisely what *sort of punishment* is inflicted upon them; whether any of them have *pins* thrusted up under their nails when suspected of shamming illness. It would have been worth while, I think, just to give us a specimen or two of their treatment; but this, I suppose, was avoided from pure “delicacy;” from a kind wish to spare our tender feelings. Thank you, gentle souls; but, another time, do not suffer your tenderness to get the better of truth. Let us have the picture full before us, tell us plainly what it is that they *do* to the Sicilian soldiers.—The idea of *arming* the Sicilian *people* against their *government* is not less amusing, especially when we recollect that one of the principal grounds of the Anti-jacobin war, was, that the French Convention invited any people who were oppressed to rise against their government. These are precious avowals, and really one would almost think that the object was to show to the whole world, that the French Convention was right in all they did as to foreign governments.—But, of all the notions inculcated in these writings, the most amusing certainly is that of compelling the government to give up its army into our hands, to put all the forts and military posts into our possession, and to make us masters of a part, at least, of the revenue; and all this for what? Why, for the purpose of preserving the INDEPENDENCE of the country! Oh, impudence unparalleled! And yet these same men affect to laugh at the idea of Denmark and Prussia and Saxony being *independent*; and they scruple not to abuse Napoleon, to call him upstart Despot and remorseless Tyrant, because he is supposed to dictate to these states a system of commercial laws, a fact of which there is little doubt, but of which they have no proof. They call him *treacherous* because he has entered Spain with an army and is endeavouring to subdue it; and, in almost the same breath, they openly recommend the seizure of Sicily by our army, who, be it observed, entered Sicily as *allies*, and have remained there under the sanction of a *treaty*. One of our venal prints (the most venal of all), the *TIRES*, recommends the sending of the king and queen of Sicily to *Naples*. These are the words, used by that print on the 28th of

September: “We think, though, as we have before stated, our means of judging are very scanty, that it would not be an impolitic scheme to *land the King and Queen of the two Sicilies on the continental part of their Majesties' dominions*, in order that they, and particularly the latter of them, might head the *partisans* which they possess there, and rescue *Naples from the grasp of Murat*. A Regency could govern the island in their absence.”—When the queen of Sicily reads this, as I dare say she will, I wonder whether she will look back to 1799, when she and Lady Hamilton and her husband and Lord Nelson were at Naples and in the Bay! I wonder whether she will recollect ELEONORA FONSECA!—In justification of this measure, which is nothing short of a sentence of death against the king and queen of Naples, the same print, of the 30th of September, offers the following arguments: “Thus much is very clear, that if one party is for the French, the other must be against them; and the inference is no less obvious, that as we were called to Sicily to protect that island from the French, we must unite with that party which is most likely to be sincere in acting with us for the attainment of so desirable an object. Our view is the *independence* of Sicily, and has only relation to the *external* politics of the country. With the internal ones, we have neither the right nor the wish to interfere; except they, themselves, are perversely thrown across our path, and then they must be cleared out of the way. If the Court and people fight with each other, so let them; it is not our concern, provided we have placed in our hands the means of securing our own safety, and repelling the common enemy. But if either Court or people think of calling in the French to aid their party politics, the *faction* that does that immediately becomes French to us, and must be rooted out, not for our advantage merely, but for the preservation of the island. We seek to impose no new King on it, as Buonaparte does: we seek to levy no tyrannical conscription: we are only struggling to let it have the power, SO DEAR TO HUMANITY, of directing its own affairs, and acting as an *independent* State. This power we must assist it in retaining as long as it can; and, at all events, we must take care, that if it is relinquished, it may not be put into the hands of our enemies.”—So dear to humanity! Oh, detestable hypocrite! And you want, do

you, to assume the command of the Sicilian army and to appropriate the revenues of the country, in order to enable Sicily to direct its own affairs! You would not do as Buonaparté does, eh? No, you would send the king and queen of Sicily to Naples there to be torn in atoms, while he gives the Bourbons of Spain a princely establishment in France. You would set up *no new king*, not you indeed: you would only just take the country for yourself. Your object is to secure the *independence* of Sicily, and to secure that object you only want to have the army, the forts and the revenue in your hands, and to “root out” all those who would oppose this “moderate” wish. You say, that those who wish to *call in the French* become French to you; but you will not give the world *proof*, or something like proof of such a wish? “If the Court think of calling in the French;” but, how are you to know their *thoughts*; and, was there ever before heard of such intolerable tyranny as that of proceeding to punish people for *presumed thoughts*? This charge of wishing in favour of the French is a sweeping one. There is no case that it will not suit; no object that it will not reach. We here see nothing but hypothesis; nothing but suspicion thrown out: if one party are *for* the French; if either court or people *think* of calling in the French. So that, whether it be the *presumed wish* of the one or the other, we are thereon to found a right of “rooting that party out.” This, if it produce no effect upon the people of England, will not fail to produce effect in other parts of the world.—Before I dismiss this subject, I cannot refrain from saying a few words upon the proposition that these writers make of seizing upon the island of Sicily, for our own use.—The rabble of politicians, whether in high or low life, are always eager for new acquisitions of territory, very seldom reflecting whether they are likely to produce good or evil, and they are sure to have on their side all that numerous tribe, who are continually gaping for the taxes, and to give them a chance of getting at which every new acquisition of territory is admirably calculated.—But, if this seizing proposition were to be adopted, what effect does the reader imagine it would have upon the minds of the *Spaniards*, some of whom have already been charged with the *crime* of having apprehensions upon the score of our sending *reinforcements to Cadiz*, and of our having a design to place their troops and their

provinces under the command of our own officers? Does the reader suppose, that a seizure of Sicily, and, of course, a virtual dethronement of the king, would tend to diminish the apprehensions of those *Spaniards*? Say, that we stop short of this, and content ourselves with the “moderate and reasonable” demands, suggested by Captain Pasley and approved of by the venal English prints; namely, with a surrender of the Sicilian army and a part of the revenues into our hands; say, that we content ourselves with these “moderate and reasonable” terms, is it likely, that the confidence of the *Spaniards* will thereby be completely restored? —Well; but shall we be able to keep Sicily, to “preserve its *independence*;” shall we, even if we seize the island, be able to accomplish this amiable and disinterested purpose for any length of time? Shall we be able to beat the Sicilian army and arm the peasantry against the government and, at the same time, defend the island against the French; shall we be able thus to “preserve the *independence*” of Sicily without an army of *fifty or sixty thousand men* and an annual expenditure of ten millions in Bank Notes? Do these projectors think of these things? No, they think of nothing but what they suppose will be pleasing to those whose very wishes they vie with each other in anticipating.—Upon this subject the Morning Chronicle, which is supposed to speak the sentiments of the OUTS, holds a strange language. It is always blaming the ministers for want of *VIGOUR* in their transactions with Sicily. Not a word about *justice* or *consistency*; not a word in favour of the *people* of Sicily; but hints at the misconduct of the Court *towards us*, and a call for *vigorous measures*. The venal prints, fighting under the flag of Captain Pasley, have acted a more candid part; they have told us what they mean by *vigorous measures*. They would demand the Sicilian army and part of the revenues to be given up to us, and, if this “moderate and reasonable” demand was refused, they would “root out” the refusing party, and, if the Court were that party, they would toss them down upon the strand of the Bay of Naples, where they would have as good a chance as if tossed into a tyger’s den amongst a dam and her young ones. This, at any rate, is frank: it is speaking out: we know what the parties mean; whereas the Morning Chronicle keeps dinning in our

ears nothing but a sort of mysterious call for *vigour*.—This is, however, the general tone of the OUTS, who, upon all occasions, find fault of the ministers for their want of *vigour*; which, being fairly interpreted, means, that they would, if they were in place, do the *same acts* that the ministers do, but that they would do them in a more *vigorous* manner. We never hear them complain of the *injustice* of any of the acts of their rivals; never of any waste of the public money; never of any encroachment on the liberties of the people. All that they complain of is, a *want of vigour*. Let them look at the acts of our government for the last twenty years; let them look into the Statute Book for that period, and they will, I think, see no marks of a want of *vigour*. We have heard much talk about a *vigour beyond the law*; but, really, those laws are of themselves sufficiently *vigorous*.—To hear these eternal complaints of a want of *vigour*, who would not suppose, that our government had, for a long while, neglected the use of its powers, and had been so very lenient and indulgent as to have suffered the people to run riot with ease, riches, and licentiousness! Ah! these complaints of a *want of vigour* in their rivals ought to make us cautious how we give any encouragement to the OUTS.—This charge of a want of *vigour* has been set up against all the old governments that have fallen before the republicans of France. “Louis XVI. was a *weak-minded* man; he was *too lenient*; he yielded *too much* to his people.” And the same charge has gone round. All the fallen kings “wanted *vigour*,” according to the Anti-jacobin notions. They were pretty *vigorous*, however, you will find, if you examine the acts of their days of power. There was no want of *vigour* in France, while the *lettres de cachet* and the *Bastile* were in vogue. The kings of Prussia were very *vigorous* men; and so were and are the Czars of Muscovy. Even the Stadtholder gave unquestionable proofs of *vigour* when he called in the Prussian army, commanded by the Duke of Brunswick, to put down the Dutch Patriots. And, though last not least, our august allies, the Court of Sicily, were not wanting in *vigour* when they were upon the continent. In short, they have all been quite *vigorous* enough, except as *against the French armies*, in which case they have, indeed, shown a lamentable deficiency in this seemingly *prime quality of regular government*.—It

seems never to have occurred to any of these complainants of a want of *vigour*, that it was possible, that some of the fallen governments might have been *too vigorous* before they were attacked by the French; that, when the French came, they found their *vigour* all exhausted. It seems never to have occurred to them, that there were any means, other than those of *force and punishment*, by which the fallen governments might have convinced their subjects of the utility of resisting the French armies. No such thought seems ever to have occurred to them. They can see clearly enough all the *tyranny* of *Bonaparte’s system*. They can rail against him in a most manly strain. The *Courier* of the 3rd instant, in speaking of his present tour through his maritime dominions and of his rigorous measures as to commerce, says: “There is one consolation arising out of this increase of severity; that as *it punishes his own subjects most*, it renders him more and more *odious, and may accelerate his downfall*. “Intoxicated by power, he appears always to forget that *tyranny has its limits*; “that there is a period *beyond* which the *oppressor cannot oppress*, and the oppressed *will not endure*. He flatters himself perhaps that his authority is now perfectly consolidated, and his despotism secure. Just so do ALL TYRANTS; “Caligula never thought himself so safe and firm as on the very day he was dappled.”—Very good; but let the observations be *general*. Let them apply to *all tyrants* in every part of the world, and of every sort, whether open and bold in their *tyranny*; or whether their *tyranny* be marked by the *basest hypocrisy* and by all the *malice of cowardice*; let not these just observations remain unapplied to the *shamming, cheating, smiling, cut-throat-tyranny*, which merits as great, and a much greater, degree of hatred, than a *tyranny* without disguise, for the latter is, in reality, much less cruel than the former.—To return, for a moment, to the subject of Sicily, I beg the reader not to believe, that I feel any *partiality* for the king or queen of that country; I beg him to believe, that I am, at best, indifferent as to what our government may do respecting them. My concern is for the people of Sicily and the people of England, the latter of whom have long been paying enormous sums of money for the purpose of maintaining over the former that *very government which we are*, by



our venal writers, now told is an intolerable tyranny, and which these writers openly purpose to "root out."—What we shall next hear of from Sicily no man can guess. It is quite impossible to conjecture how the thing may go on; but of this we may be well assured, that, in the end, the *cause of freedom will be benefited even by the intrigues and cabals in the Island of Sicily.*

SPAIN AND HER COLONIES! — But, here, reader, is a scene opening upon us! A *declaration of independence on the shores of the gulf of Mexico!* And, at almost the same moment, the Cortes of Spain declaring, that "Spain is not the patrimony of any family?" The work of revolution has but just made a serious beginning. The Anti-jacobins may sharpen up their pens anew; for they will have a sufficiency of employment. But, I imagine, they will not again be able to persuade the people of England out of voluntary loans and contributions in order to preserve to themselves "the blessed comforts of religion," and to keep "the gloomy despair of atheism" out of their families. No, no: this will not do again. If it were to succeed, it would be quite useless; for, with all the power we possess, we should not be able to prevent revolutions in a *world* that is resolved upon revolution.—I have not room here to enter into any particular observations upon the great public acts above-mentioned; but, I cannot help remarking, that the moment we hear, that a part of the Spanish Colonies have declared themselves *independent* and have promulgated the principles of freedom, at that very moment we hear of Commissioners appointed by our government to mediate between them and Old Spain! We must have, as the old saying is, "a 'finger in the pye.'" Why could we not have let these people alone? What need had we to proffer our *mediation*? And, what can that mediation mean, unless it be to bring the *Colonists back to their former state*? Vain pursuit! Never will they again acknowledge subjection to Spain; and if the rulers of Spain (be they who they may) are wise, they will at once acquiesce in the separation; and cultivate an intercourse with the new state, or states, as fast as freedom shall spread itself over those fair but long-degraded regions. Spain, supposing her to be undivided at home and without an enemy in Europe, has not the power to subdue any

considerable force raised against her in South America. What, then, can she be expected to do in her *present state*? The war of Napoleon in the Peninsula will, then, in all probability, give freedom to South America; and we see, that it has already drawn from the rulers of Spain (his rivals) an abolition of the odious feudal tyrannies, and a declaration that Spain is not the patrimony of any family. Whatever, therefore, may have been his intentions, which, indeed, appear to have been merely those of a conqueror, the war which he has waged and is waging in Spain may be safely said to have produced great good to mankind. Our resistance of him (without entering into our motives) has also been of use in the same way. Between us we have given the South Americans time and opportunity to break their bonds; and, let us hope for a similar result in Old Spain; a hope which must, I think, be uppermost in the heart of every man who is not the enemy of his species. I am aware, however, how the souls of the Anti-jacobins suffer under the apprehension of seeing Spain and South America exhibit examples of freedom. I think I see them now scowling over the "RIGHTS OF MAN," promulgated from the borders of the Mexican Gulph. In vain do they look round them for the means of forming another crusade against republicans and levellers. The heroes of Pilnitz are nowhere now to be found. All the Anti-jacobins can do is to sit and curse the voice of freedom that is, in every direction, forcing its way through the shattered and shaking fabric of tyrannical power, and calling upon the slave to throw off his chains, whether fastened on him by rude force, or, by slow and unseen degrees, drawn round him by the hands of *hypocrisy and fraud.*

COL. M'MAHON.—A gentleman, upon whose word I can rely, requests me to state, in correction of an error in my last, that Col. M'Mahon "has been out of the army for the last sixteen years; that, as to his services, he shared fully with the other British Officers, as a Subaltern in the 44th Regiment throughout the seven year's campaign in America, at the head of which fell General Agnew and Major Hope, and afterwards as a Captain under the command of Lord Moira; and that his conduct was universally such as became an officer and a gentleman."—As

to the general conduct and character of Mr. M'Mahon, it was unnecessary for his friend to say a word; for I did not throw out the most distant hint against either, as, indeed, with truth, I could not, having never heard any thing to justify such a hint. With regard to the error relating to Mr. M'Mahon's having received pay as an officer in the army, the fault is not mine. "Men should be what they seem;" and, as he bore the name of *Colonel*, I reasonably concluded that he was a *Colonel*. This was not, however, made by me a circumstance of much weight; for, as I observed before, his *services* were of a sort to be *utterly unknown to the public*, and, therefore, to the public he ought not to have come for a reward.—As to his services as a *Subaltern* and *Captain*, during the unfortunate and disgraceful war against the American States, no man will, I am sure, pretend, that he had a fair claim, at *his age*, to any rewards other than those which the *military service* itself provided for him; and, when he chose to quit the army, he, of course, forfeited that claim. But, surely, no man will pretend that the present grant has had eye to the services here spoken of! No: it is too monstrous, even for these times, to suppose, that a man, who, as *Captain*, chose to quit the army, sixteen years ago, in the *middle of a war*, is to be rewarded for *past services* with a grant for life equal to the pay of *twenty captains* in that same army.—Much, however, as I lament the granting of this place, I lament it most of all because I cannot help looking upon it as a symptom of what we have to expect in future.

INVASION.—This, in all probability, will soon become a copious subject. In another part of this Number the reader will find some documents relating to a threatened, or talked of, or surmised intended invasion of *Jersey* and *Guernsey*. I have no time to make any remark upon these at present, and shall content myself with a decided expression of my opinion, that, if we have a timely reform of the *Commons' House of Parliament*, we may laugh at all Napoleon's threats of invasion; but, if we have not that reform.....what then? Why, then we may LAUGH AT THEM TOO!

W^m. COBBETT.
State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
4th October, 1811

P. S. I have not room to notice the *Essex Meeting* in the present Number.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SICILY.—*Representation of the Deputation of the Kingdom of Sicily, to his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies.—Palermo, 9th July, 1811.*

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY;—By a Royal Dispatch of the 30th of June last, your Majesty did command this Deputation to state, why they have submitted to your Majesty, in their Representation of the 13th of May last, a Paper signed by forty Barons, by a Guardian to a Minor, and by two younger Sons of Barons, respecting the tax on payments of one per cent. assessed by your Majesty by your Royal Edict of the 14th February, together with the observations the Deputation may find it incumbent to make thereon.—In obedience to your Royal commands, the Deputation humbly state to your Majesty that only the desire not to withhold any thing from your Royal knowledge, has induced them to submit the said Paper, and to expose ingenuously how, and by whom, it was presented.—Meanwhile, the Deputation is of opinion, that the said Paper is not entitled to any further course; because your Majesty's Edict, levying the tax of one per cent. on payments, contains no encroachments on the laws of the kingdom, and on the privileges granted to it by your august predecessors.—May God preserve your Majesty and the Royal Family for many happy years.—Your Majesty's most humble subjects, the Deputies of the Kingdom, (Signed,) (Signed,)

The Prince BUTERA.

R. Archbishop of PALERMO.

The Prince CUTO, Deputy Senior.

The Prince CAMPO-FRANCO.

B. SERIO, Bishop of Ermopoli.

The Marquis CALLENTINI.

The Prince SCORDIA.

The Canon LORENZO DI ANTONI.

The Chevalier GASPARÉ PALERMO.

The Prince TORREMUZZA.

The Canon PAOLO FILIPPONI.

The Prince VALDINA, Prothonotary to the Kingdom.

ANTONIO DELLA REVERE, Secretary.

SICILY.—*Article in the Gazette, respecting the Arrest of the Nobles.—19th July, 1811.*

We learn from Palermo, that on the night of the 19th inst: the following Nobility were arrested by order of the Sicil-

lian Government, and were immediately afterwards sent on board the Sicilian ship of war the Tartar, to be conveyed to the Island of Favignana, &c. Their names are, the Princes of Belmonte, Villa Franca, Aci, Castel Nuovo, and the Duke of Angio.—The arrest and exile of these Noblemen has given rise to a report, which is wholly destitute of foundation, which is injurious to the English character, and calculated to diminish the authority of the British residing in this island. The report is, that these proceedings were instituted at the desire of the British Government, and that the Admiral and English Chargé d'Affaires, residing in Palermo, had taken a principal part in the execution of it. It was also asserted, that an English ship of war was employed on this occasion. Such a representation is known to be utterly false and absurd, by the inhabitants of Palermo, who were eye-witnesses of the transaction; it will also be acknowledged that such an interference would be both opposed to the established conduct of the British Government, and to the duties of its principal agents in this Island.—Be the rumours on this subject what they may, we are empowered from the highest authority to contradict them, and to declare that the English had not only no participation in the business, but not even the smallest knowledge of it. The inventors and propagators of such vile calumnies could have no other object than to promote discord between the two nations, and to disunite the hearts of the Sicilian people from their best friends.

SICILY.—*Royal Edict.—19th July, 1811.*

It having been represented to his Majesty, that on several occasions the under-mentioned subjects have shewn manifest proofs of turbulence, and of a disposition to interrupt the public tranquillity, having taken the advice proper on such occasions, and after mature deliberation on the consequences of such disobedient conduct, he has resolved in his sovereign pleasure to order the arrest and exile to different Islands of the following persons:—The Prince of Belmonte Vintimiglio, the Prince of Villa Franca, who is also suspended from his functions of Colonel of the 1st Regiment of Royal Dragoons, &c. the Prince of Verulsterra, the Prince of Villarmosa, the Prince of Aci, who is also dismissed from his post of Adjutant General of the King, &c. &c. **FERDINAND,**

JERSEY.—*By the States of the Island of Jersey, in the year 1811, the 21st day of September.*

The States have been this day convened, at the instance of his Excellency Lieutenant General Don, Lieutenant Governor and Commander in Chief of this island, his Excellency has communicated to the States a letter from the Secretary of State, acquainting him, that the enemy meditates an attack upon this and the adjoining islands. The Commander-in-Chief also communicates to the States the orders he had given in consequence of this information, both respecting the troops of the line and the militia, and the different preparations he had made in the event of an attack. The States could not avoid observing, that in the wisdom of the measures his Excellency had taken, with so much promptitude, for the event of an attack, nothing necessary for such a crisis has escaped his vigilance and foresight; and they offer him their most sincere acknowledgments for this new proof of his attention, and of his indefatigable zeal for the safety of the country, in addition to so many others which had already acquired for him by the justest title, the love and gratitude of the inhabitants. The States feel themselves infinitely flattered by the confidence which the Right Honourable Secretary of State has in the loyalty and approved zeal of the inhabitants of this island, and they pray his Excellency to assure him that this confidence shall never be disappointed. Their ancestors, who, in the most stormy times have given proofs of their attachment to their Sovereigns, and of their inviolable fidelity, have given to their descendants an example which they will ever follow from duty and from inclination. The greatest sacrifices will cost them nothing in the imitation of so fine a model; to preserve them to themselves, and to transmit to their posterity the precious happiness they enjoy under the mildest and most happy of Governments. His Excellency is, without doubt, persuaded that the States will eagerly enter into his salutary views, and second his efforts to put the place in the best possible state of defence. Animated by these sentiments, and regarding the fortress on the mount of St. Hilier as a most important point of defence; and considering that the advancement and completion of the works of that fortress, are most essential to the preser-

ration of the island in general, they offer their services to his Excellency, to be employed in whatever manner he may think they can be useful towards this object, and they invite their fellow citizens to assist, by their bodily labour, their horses, carts, and waggons, when they shall be called upon by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The States repose with the most perfect confidence, on the paternal care of the Government for the protection and the necessary aid for the defence of the island in this critical period; and they have no doubt that his Excellency the Commander in Chief will make such representations on that head as circumstances shall appear to require. This act shall be printed and published.

JEAN DE VEULLE, *Secretary.*

REGULATIONS.

The States of the Isle of Jersey have thought proper, in the present conjuncture to establish the following Regulations, which shall be printed, published, and stuck up:—Art. 1. In case of alarm or attack, which alarm or attack shall be considered as lasting till the troops are released from duty, it is expressly ordered to the tavern keepers to keep their houses shut, and not to distribute liquor to the regular soldiers or the militia, or to any one, without a written permission from an Officer commanding a detachment either of regulars or militia, under the penalty of a fine not exceeding 300 livres and the forfeiture of the licence.—2. It is equally enjoined to all other persons not to sell or distribute liquors to the Regulars or Militia, or to any one else, without the permission required by the foregoing article, on pain of a fine not exceeding 300 livres for each offence.—3. In case of alarm or attack, the soldiers or other persons employed in the service of the Militia are forbidden to enter taverns, public houses, or private houses, to procure liquor, without the permission of their commanding Officer, under pain of being considered disobedient, and punished according to the nature of the case.—4. Constables are required always to keep a sufficient quantity of candles, in order to illuminate the churches without delay in case of alarm in the night.—5. In case of alarm in the night, it is enjoined to the inhabitants of St. Helier and St. Aubin to place candles in the windows of their houses to give light to the streets.—6. The States, with a view of encouraging

the vigilance of the guards about the island, and of rousing the attention of all persons to the safety of the country in these critical times, have agreed to grant the sum of 1,000 livres to the first man, whether chief of a guard, sentinel, or other, who shall descry an enemy's fleet destined for attacking this island, and who shall take the necessary steps to inform his Excellency the Commander in Chief, as soon as possible; that is, if he is a Chief of a Guard, by sending without delay an intelligent man of his guard to carry the news to the Commander in Chief; if he is a sentinel by informing his Chief of the news, in order that the latter may send off a dispatch: and if he is any other person, by taking prompt and effectual measures to let the intelligence be known as soon as possible at head-quarters.—7. The States considering also that it is of essential importance to the defence of the country in case of attack, to remove from the coast, and to put out of the reach of the enemy the horses and cattle of the inhabitants, have thought it their duty to enjoin women, old and young persons, who shall not be otherwise employed in opposing the enemy, to drive away as quick as possible the cattle from the coast, to convey them into the interior, and to carry off as much forage and provisions of all kinds as they can. The States promise and engage to be answerable to the proprietors for the value of the cattle thus sent into the interior, in case of accident or loss, or the cattle being taken and employed for the public service: and the States declare at the same time to those who neglect or fail to use these means of preserving their property, by putting it out of the reach of the enemy, that they shall not be attended to in requiring indemnification in case of accident or capture.—8. A reasonable reward will be given by the States to those who have the misfortune to be wounded in the defence of the country: and a pension to the widows during their widowhood, and to the children of those who may be killed: the whole according to circumstances, the exigency of the cases, and the situation of the families.

JEAN DE VEULLE, *Registrar.*

GUERNSEY.—*Proclamation.*—By his Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir John Doyle, bart. and K. C. Lieutenant-Governor of Guernsey, and commanding his Majesty's Forces in Guernsey and Alderney. Sept. 20, 1811.

Whereas certain intelligence has been received of an intended attack of the enemy upon this Island, Lieutenant General sir John Doyle, feeling the most perfect reliance upon the zeal and courage of the Loyal Inhabitants in the defence of every thing that is dear to them, and upon the gallantry and discipline of the Troops, can have no doubts as to the issue of the contest. But in order to prevent the confusion incident to an invasion, by individuals unattached to Corps, not knowing their exact point of Rendezvous, it is hereby directed that all Strangers, as well Subjects of his Majesty as Foreigners, who are not enrolled in any Regiment or Corps of Militia, do forthwith send in their names and places of residence to the Office of Colonel Sir Thomas Saumarez, the Inspector of Militia, in order that in the event of alarm, their services may be made available to the general cause.—The Alarm Post of persons of this description, will be the Exercising Ground at Fort George.—The Constables are earnestly requested to enforce the Ordinances of the Royal Court respecting the notice required to be given by all owners of Hotels, Lodgings, and Public Houses, of the lodgers who may be resident with them.—Persons having on hand any quantity of Flour and Provisions for sale, will be pleased to give in a return of the quality and quantity, in order that the same may be purchased by the Deputy Commissary-General, should circumstances render it necessary.—And whereas it appears that Fuel has been frequently stolen from the furnaces for heating shot around the Coast, notice is hereby given, that any person detected in the commission of such an offence, will be prosecuted, not as an ordinary thief, but as a traitor to his country.

SICILY.—*Publication in the COURIER News-paper of the 1st of October, 1811, containing an Extract from a Work of Capt. Pasley.*

Our connection with the Sicilian Government is reported to be so precarious, as to render a state of open hostility with it preferable to that in which, *without any of the benefits of alliance, without any of the cordiality or co-operation of friendship*, we have all the expences of a subsidy; we employ a force (capable of making ourselves masters of the Island), in defending it for the lawful sovereign, we pay him a large sum for the purpose of enabling him

to increase the means of defence, and yet we are told that our assistance has created *no feeling of gratitude*, and that proposals and plans obviously calculated for the improvement of the defence of the Island, are either received in the outset with suspicion, or thwarted in their execution, or altogether rejected. This will scarcely be believed, except upon the supposition of *treachery on the part of the Sicilian Government*; and yet *what could be gained by treachery towards this Country?* Subjugation by the enemy, dependence upon Buonaparté—the *lowest degradation*, and the *vilest slavery*. But folly and supineness, and misplaced confidence on the part of a Government, may enable men, (who have traitorous views) to subvert that government without any participation on the part of the person at the head of it. Look at the example of Prussia!—However, without meaning to compare that unfortunate and abused Monarch with the Sicilian Government, we shall quote some extracts from a Work published by Capt. Pasley, in which our past, present, and future relations with Sicily are treated with considerable ability.—“Nothing (see page 347, second edition) can be more precarious than our present footing in that Island. By the late operations of the combined armies in the Spanish peninsula, the absolute necessity of having the chief command, when we act in concert with an allied force inferior to ourselves in the art of war, has been fully proved. Now, the native Sicilian army, although composed of old soldiers, is, on account of the vices of its military constitution, and of a discontented spirit arising from bad usage, still less to be depended upon than the rawest levies that ever took the field in the Spanish peninsula; the officers at its head are more jealous of us, and will prove, when put to the test, infinitely more untractable than any of the Spanish chiefs, for they are without the patriotic and manly spirit which checks these selfish feelings in the latter,* and a total inde-

* “The men highest in office and command, or, at least, in influence with the Court of Sicily, are equally foreign by birth, both to that Island and to Great Britain, it is their interest to keep us as much in the back ground as possible, lest we should look into the management of our own money, the countries from whence these men sprung, and whether they will naturally wish to retire, in order to enjoy

pendence of command, with a most complete want of concert, at present exists between the Sicilian and the British troops. Hence, that we should derive any effectual resistance from our allies, in case the island were attacked, is a perfect chimera; nor can we, as things now stand, diminish our force, for the purpose of attacking the

the rich harvest of their diplomatic and official labours, which they have reaped out of the taxes levied both in England and Sicily, being subject to Buonaparté; it is natural that they should seek opportunities to do him some service in order to make their peace with him.—At a time when we were paying a large subsidy to the government of Naples, as our secret friends, they kept their friendship so very secret, that it looked like the bitterest enmity. They refused us even the most paltry accommodations, which could have put them to no possible expense or trouble. They would not permit a British Captain of a Man of War, anchored in Naples Bay, the trifling convenience of repairing a boat with his own carpenters and with his own materials, in their dock-yard, nor would they even allow him to make use of a raft in the Mole for that purpose; and the only reason alleged by the Minister of Marine for his refusal was, that this insignificant act of civility would give offence to the French party, so completely were they the friends or vassals of France. Soon after the time alluded to, they took the preliminary step for excluding us from the ports of Sicily, by putting Malta in quarantine; a thing which can be accounted for by no public reason, except their fear or love of the French, and hatred of us. It was certainly a hostile act; and the odium of it was not diminished, when we knew, that all the ports of Sicily were at that time swarming with French privateers, and heard that a British squadron had been actually refused the common refreshments of water and vegetables at Palermo. This squadron had not come from Malta, consequently the quarantine, had it been a just one, could not have applied to it. This state of affairs cannot be called neutrality. In my humble opinion, it was open war against us, for the refusal of water may cause the destruction of a fleet. But as the British Commander was told, the Government of Naples and Sicily were our secret friends; and this it seems gave them a right to do us as much mischief as they pleased.”

enemy in some other point, with any degree of prudence. In short, all things considered, our present alliance with the Government of Sicily, is upon the very worst terms which the imagination of man could have contrived for ourselves, for the people of that island, and for its King, as far as he takes any interest in the preservation of the remaining part of his dominions.—Having sufficiently lamented these evils, let us now enquire into the proper mode of remedying them—The first step is to point out to the Court of Palermo, the total insecurity of the Island under the present circumstances, and to request they will for the common good of the allied Powers, *appoint the British General in Sicily, Commander in Chief of their army*; at the same time placing *their own Commissariat and Paymaster General's departments*, under the direction of the gentlemen who are at the head of the same departments in *the British army*; if the Sicilian Government accede to these requests, we shall subsidize them on the only terms we ought ever to subsidize a foreign Power; by having the chief command of their army entirely in our hands, and by providing for all its wants ourselves, *without allowing a single guinea of our subsidy to enter the Treasury of our Ally*. By these means although the improvement of many of the Officers, who have grown grey under the present vicious system, may be despaired of; the great body of the Officers, and all the soldiers, when they find themselves *well-treated*, may recover, or acquire a proper spirit, and become zealous in the cause; and the conditions of all ranks being bettered, the envy and perhaps hatred, with which *the Sicilian now look upon the British troops* may give place to attachment, and a necessary emulation may be excited in the minds of the former.—Should our alliance with Sicily be *modified* in this manner, the terms, although better than they are at present, would still remain very disadvantageous to Great Britain; for nothing can be more *unfair, and unjust*, than that the *whole resources of so rich and great an island as Sicily*, should be solely applied to the *pomp and pleasures of its Court*, and to the charges of its *civil administration*; without leaving, at least, some surplus of revenue *for us*, who have been, and are still, providing the *whole* of the troops necessary for its defence. By such an arrangement, however, we should find ourselves much more secure in Sicily, as a *military station*.

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—But as it is likely from their former diplomatic transactions with us, that the Court of Palermo may have formed a very poor opinion of our firmness and penetration, it is by no means improbable, that they may endeavour to evade or baffle us in our requests, or that they may even give us a downright refusal. They may tell us for instance, "that they are not convinced by our arguments, as to the necessity of the measures which we propose; that the proper time to have made such stipulations was when we first entered into an alliance with them; that we are now bound by a treaty which we cannot in justice infringe; that no alteration can be made without mutual consent; and that they, as one of the high contracting parties, do not admit of the propriety of any."—Such a refusal on the part of the Court of Palermo, although very pernicious to the defence of Sicily, would, in point of justice, be perfectly correct; provided they, themselves, have at all times preserved good faith towards us: but treaties are binding upon two parties; and they, on their side, by the articles of their treaty with us, engaged to keep, constantly on foot, a well-disciplined regular army of a certain strength. If on enquiry into the present and past state of their army, we should find that its discipline is bad, that the soldiers have not been properly clothed, fed, and paid, and that the just claims of the officers have not been attended to; so that, upon the whole, *their conduct to their troops has been shameful and oppressive*; as both officers and soldiers have *no scruple in publicly asserting*; if we further find that they have always deceived us by false musters, never at any time keeping on foot the number of troops engaged; a thing which I have heard from the best authorities in the British army, and which is talked of as a matter of notoriety all over Sicily; then it will be absurd in us to admit of any refusal on the part of the Court of Palermo to our proposals, for they having failed in their engagements to us, we shall be no longer bound to adhere to ours; and, consequently, the least thing which we can do, is to withdraw our subsidy, and to leave them to maintain their army the best way they can by their own resources.—We may then by means of the money thus saved, in a short time, raise a much more efficient army of our own, than we should ever be able to make out of theirs, were it put under our command. Hence the refusal of our demands,

by the Court of Palermo, would be very much to our advantage; for they would thereby forfeit all claim to *our national generosity*, which they have already so much abused. It may be said, that should we withdraw our subsidy, in consequence of such a refusal, the Court of Palermo might feel themselves so much aggrieved by this just and necessary measure as to *make peace with Buonaparté, and call the French into Sicily*. This rash step, by which they would insure their own destruction, would be the most fortunate thing for us that could happen; for, as I have before observed, in treating of the state of that Island, we shall have a *much better chance of success, by fighting there, as the enemies, than as the allies, of the present Government*. This would be the case even if the French had an army of 30,000 men in Sicily; but it must be recollect, that they are at present blustering on the opposite shore, and before the Sicilian Government could profit by the assistance of French troops to drive us out of their Island, which they must beg our permission to let them cross over, which we, it may be presumed, shall *not be weak enough to grant*. As for the *Government of Sicily making war against us*, without the assistance of the French, by their own resources alone, unless they have been most egregiously duping us for the last five years, that is a thing absolutely impossible; for, by their own account, they have never been able to maintain their troops without our subsidies, so that the moment they declare against us, *their army must disperse without a battle*, for want of pay. Admitting, however, that their poverty was a mere pretext, in order to delude us out of our money; and that Sicily might have been very well able to support an army without our assistance, to say nothing of the peasants, whom *we might easily arm in our favour*. The regular native army in Sicily is not now, and never has been, *strong enough to match us in the field*. And any hostilities, therefore, on the part of the Court of Palermo, are by no means a thing to be dreaded; on the contrary, *they would give us a right once more, to take possession of Sicily for ourselves*, which would be attended with the most beneficial effects to our national powers and prosperity: NOR OUGHT WE TO HAVE THE SMALLEST SCRUPLE IN ADOPTING THIS VIGOROUS MEASURE, if the Court of Palermo, by their MISCONDUCT, give us JUST REASON for it.—Unless they even know, and feel, that we

are prepared for acting in this way, it will be impossible for us ever to depend upon their sincerity. It is absurd to suppose that any allied government in this world will not either shake us off or betray us, when it fancies it to be for its interest so to do; unless it is fully convinced, that we are not merely powerful, sincere, and good-natured friends, but that our *enmity*, when provoked, is *terrible*, and our *vengeance destructive*. If the Court of Palermo, after having received nearly *two millions sterling of British money*, without having fulfilled the stipulations by which they bound themselves, when they became our allies, should think proper to treat with contempt our *moderate and reasonable request*, that we should command an army which we ourselves *pay*; and should aggravate the whole by going over with their booty to the French, they would certainly commit a most gross violation of the law of nations and of the faith of treaties; and if we meanly and tamely allowed them to offer us all these insults and injuries with impunity, our own conduct would be contrary to every principle of reason and justice, and would make us the laughing-stock of the whole world."

SPAIN.—*Decree of the Cortes, relative to the admission of others than Nobles as Officers in the Army and Navy.—17th Aug. 1811.*

D. Fernando the VIIth, by the Grace of God, King of Spain and of the Indies, and, during his absence and captivity, the Council of Regency, authorised to act in his name, to all to whom these presents shall come: Know, that in the General and Extraordinary Cortes, assembled in the City of Cadiz, the following resolution was decreed:—The General and Extraordinary Cortes in the present situation of affairs, taking into consideration the pleasing necessity of giving every possible proof of the estimation, united by the heroic exertions which all ranks of Spaniards have made, and are now making in every possible way, in the critical circumstances of the country, against their unjust oppressors; and being desirous that the road to honour and glory should be laid open to the children of so many gallant men, that they may combine, with the bravery they inherit from their fathers, the knowledge to be acquired in these Military

Schools, admission to which has hitherto been confined to the descendants of the Nobility, decree—1st, That in all Schools and Seminaries, by land and sea, Spaniards of respectable families be admitted, provided they conform to the established regulations.—2nd, That they be also admitted as Cadets into all the corps of the army, provided they possess the qualifications requisite, without being obliged to produce any proofs of Nobility, and into the Royal Navy, the regulations, both general and particular, on this subject being suspended.—The Council of Regency will take the necessary steps to enforce this Decree, causing it to be printed, published, and circulated.

SPAIN.—*Heads of the New Constitution.—August, 1811.*

On the 19th of August, 1811, appointed for the reading of the two Sections of the Constitution which have been finished by the Committee appointed to draw it up, (and the occasion attracted a great number of auditors,)—Senior Arguelles delivered a most eloquent and erudite discourse, explanatory of the object of the Constitution, its principal bases, and the documents which had been consulted in preparing it.—Senior Perez de Castro, read in succession the two Sections, consisting of 242 articles, and including the following.

• *Preliminary and fundamental Principles.*
Spain belongs to the Spanish people, and is *not the Patrimony of any Family*.—The *Nation only* can make *Fundamental Laws*.—The Roman Catholic and Apostolic Religion, unmixed with any other, is the only Religion which the Nation professes or will profess.—The Government of Spain is an hereditary Monarchy.—The *Cortes* shall *make the Laws*, and the King shall *execute them*.

Spanish Citizens.

The Children of Spaniards, and of Foreigners married to Spanish women, or who bring a capital in order to naturalize themselves to the soil, or establish themselves in trade, or who teach any useful art, are *Citizens of Spain*.—None but *Citizens* can fill municipal offices.—The rights of Citizenship may be lost by long absence from the country, or by condemnation to corporeal or infamous punishments.

(To be continued.)